We evaluate the joint pricing of market volatility and market liquidity. Combining recent advances in continuous-time econometrics with no-arbitrage arguments, we extract novel proxies for market volatility and market illiquidity from a single time-series of high-frequency SPIDERS transaction prices. When considered individually, illiquidity and volatility shocks are shown to be strongly negatively correlated with market returns as well as with the returns on the size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolios. Shocks to illiquidity and shocks to volatility are found to be individually negatively priced. In joint speci…cations, shocks to volatility drive out shocks to illiquidity leading to a drastic reduction in the statistical signi…cance of the illiquidity factor loadings. While innovations in illiquidity and innovations in volatility may still be jointly negatively priced, as is shown for our data, the factor loadings associated with volatility shocks provide a more accurate assessment of risk. When interpreting shocks to illiquidity and shocks to volatility as proxies for a more fundamental distress factor, this result is suggestive of the superior robustness of the latter.
Aggregate illiquidity and aggregate volatility are high in less favorable states of the world. Assets whose returns are more positively correlated with their innovations will provide a hedge, thereby requiring relatively lower expected returns. 1 Admittedly, the joint pricing of market volatility and market liquidity has hardly been investigated. Even though they are arguably the result of di¤erent economic phenomena (market volatility being related with changes in fundamental asset values and market illiquidity being the outcome of aggregate trading frictions a¤ecting fundamental asset values if priced), volatility and illiquidity are positively correlated (in terms of innovations) and relatively higher in negative states of the world. Should one take the view that volatility and illiquidity may be fundamental pricing factors, as sometimes done in the literature, then it is meaningful to ask whether their individual pricing ability is preserved, when jointly considered. Should one believe that they may be proxies for a more fundamental factor (or factors) varying with the state of the economy, an argument we …nd more convincing, then again it would seem relevant to ask whether their individual explanatory power is subsumed in a model which allows for the other proxy to be present.
We make two contributions to the literature. The …rst contribution is methodological. By combining recent advances in the econometrics of high-frequency data with classical no-arbitrage arguments, we extract novel proxies for market volatility and market illiquidity from a single timeseries of high-frequency SPIDERS transaction prices. The joint evaluation of the cross-sectional pricing implications of (innovations in) market volatility and (innovations in) market illiquidity represents our second contribution.
Because SPIDERS represent ownership of a trust invested in the S&P500 index, changes in SPIDERS fundamental value re ‡ect changes in the index's fundamental value. In addition, since SPIDERS can be redeemed for the underlying portfolio of S&P500 stocks (or created in exchange for the underlying portfolio of assets), deviations of SPIDERS transaction prices from fundamental values signal pervasive market frictions rendering arbitrages harder to implement. We provide a method to separate the volatility of SPIDERS unobserved fundamental values (used as a proxy 1 The cross-sectional relation between expected stock returns and idiosyncratic, rather than systematic, liquidity has been investigated in numerous papers, including Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) , Datar et al. (1998) , and Elaswarapu (1997). Amihud (2002) , Jones (2002) , and Fujimoto (2003) , among others, study the time-series properties of market excess returns and market liquidity. The related e¤ect of idiosyncratic asymmetric information in cross-sectional asset pricing is discussed in Easley et al. (2002) . Amihud et al. (2006) and Cochrane (2005) provide discussions of the current state of the literature on liquidity and asset prices.
for market volatility) from the volatility of the di¤erence between SPIDERS transaction prices and their fundamental values (used as a proxy for market illiquidity). The method solely requires the computation of averages of high-frequency SPIDERS transaction prices sampled at di¤erent, "optimally-selected," frequencies.
When individually considered, we show that shocks to illiquidity and shocks to volatility are strongly negatively correlated with market returns, as well as with the returns on the size, bookto-market, and momentum portfolios. Consider the size decile portfolios, for instance. For both illiquidity and volatility, these individual correlations (and the related factor loadings) increase monotonically (while remaining negative) when going from small cap stocks to large cap stocks.
Hence, large cap stocks are less (negatively) correlated with both illiquidity and volatility then small cap stocks, thereby requiring lower expected returns, as empirically found in practice. Not surprisingly, the individual prices of volatility and illiquidity risk are found to be negative in the cross-section of monthly 25 size-and value-sorted Fama-French portfolios.
When jointly considered, shocks to volatility largely drive out the statistical signi…cance of shocks to illiquidity thereby leading to inaccurately estimated factor loadings in the latter case.
Ignoring the precision of the …rst-stage factor loadings, as often done in practice, we …nd that both of our derived proxies are again negatively priced. This is due to factor loadings (with respect to volatility and illiquidity, jointly) which are negative but largely increase in the size dimension (when going from small cap stocks to large cap stocks) while generally decreasing in the book-to-market dimension (when going from growth stocks to value stocks). For our sample, the performance of a 3-factor model with market returns, (innovations in) market variance, and (innovations in) market illiquidity is shown to be similar to the performance of the classical Fama-French 3-factor model, when pricing the Fama-French portfolios.
In sum, when risk is proxied by innovations in market illiquidity and market volatility individually or jointly, we …nd statistically signi…cant (negative) prices of risk associated with both measures. The quantities of risk (the factor loadings) associated with the two proxies are precisely estimated in individual models. In joint speci…cations, however, only the volatility factor loadings are estimated accurately thereby leading to a fundamental lack of robustness of illiquidity pricing (even in the presence of statistically-signi…cant illiquidity risk prices) in models allowing for market volatility. Conversely, when interpreting volatility and illiquidity as proxies for a more fundamental distress factor, this result points to an important robustness of market volatility. We stress that such a robustness is not a by-product of the way market illiquidity and market volatility are measured in this paper. The result would hold under more classical measures in the literature, as is shown below.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we discuss the de…ning features of SPIDERS. Section 2 proposes a formation mechanism for SPIDERS transaction prices.
This mechanism justi…es our identi…cation procedure for market volatility and market illiquidity. Section 3 expands on the logic of our illiquidity measure. Section 4 evaluates the empirical properties of both proxies. Particular emphasis is placed on the negative (roughly monotonic) relation between size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolio returns and volatility/illiquidity shocks. The crosssectional pricing of illiquidity and volatility is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 evaluates robustness. Section 7 concludes. Technical details, …gures, and tables are in the Appendix.
SPIDERS
Standard & Poor's depository receipts (SPDR or SPIDERS) represent shares in a trust which owns stocks in the same proportion as that found in the S&P500 index. They trade like a stock (with the ticker symbol SPY on the Amex) at approximately one-tenth of the level of the S&P500 index, and are used by large institutions and traders either as bets on the overall direction of the market or as a means of passive management.
SPIDERS are exchange traded funds (ETFs). 2 They can be redeemed for the underlying portfolio of assets at the end of the trading day. Equivalently, investors have the right to obtain newly issued SPIDERS shares from the fund company in exchange for a basket of securities that mirrors the SPIDERS'portfolio. This implies that SPIDERS, like other ETFs, must trade at a value that is near net asset value (NAV). If they traded above their NAV, arbitrageurs would purchase the basket of underlying securities for a lower price and force the fund company to issue new shares.
Conversely, if they traded below their NAV, arbitrageurs would buy shares and redeem them for the underlying portfolio of securities (see Cherkes et al., 2006 , for further discussions and comparisons between ETFs and closed-end funds). Similarly, SPIDERS'values will not deviate much from NAVs 3 during the day either, since the future convergence of prices would open up the possibility for simple, immediate investment opportunities. Assume trading prices are higher than NAVs.
An arbitrageur could sell SPIDERS short, 4 buy the underlying basket of security, wait for price convergence, and unwind the position for an initial pro…t. 2 A growing academic literature focuses on ETFs. Among other issues, the existing work studies the dynamics of price deviations from net asset value (Engle and Sarkar, 2002) , compares the return from holding ETFs (speci…cally, SPIDERS) to the return from holding the underlying index (Elton et al., 2002) , analyzes the tax implications of ETFs (Poterba and Shoven, 2002) , investigates price discovery (Hasbrouck, 2002) and competition (Boehmer and Boehmer, 2002) in the ETF market. 3 The NAV is computed at market close. During the day, an estimated value of the portfolio called Indicative Optimized Portfolio Value (IOPV) is posted. The IOPV is provided every 15 seconds using the most recent transaction price of each component of the portfolio. 4 Contrary to individual stocks, SPIDERS can be short-sold on a down tick.
As Elton et al. (2002) and Engle and Sarkar (2002) point out, the process of share deletion/creation acts as an extremely e¤ective mechanism in keeping prices close to NAV and assuring that potential di¤erences disappear quickly. Conversely, since arbitrages require acquisition of the underlying basket of securities, the extent of deviations from NAV should signal pervasive market frictions rendering arbitrages harder to implement.
Importantly, rather than focusing on deviations of trade prices from NAV or IOPV, we measure deviations from unobserved fundamental values. Given the basket nature of SPIDERS, the fundamental value of a SPIDER share should coincide with the fundamental value of the index.
Fundamental values are only approximated by the NAVs at close and by the IOPVs during the day.
Measuring deviations from fundamental values rather than from NAV is important as emphasized, for example, by Engle and Sarkar (2002) . The NAV is evaluated at the closing transaction price of each of the assets. However, each closing transaction price could be higher or lower than the individual fundamental value. In addition, the closing transaction could occur earlier in the day, especially for less frequently-traded stocks. 5 Similarly, the IOPVs may be stale in that they are posted at equispaced intervals of 15 seconds, are evaluated at trade prices and, hence, likely deviate from fundamental values. More generally, it is well-known from classical market microstructure theory that transaction prices (and, as said, NAVs and IOPVs are computed at transaction values) di¤er from fundamental values. The size of these deviations will, again, depend on liquidity. 6 Hence, aggregate illiquidity may a¤ect both the size of the deviations between SPIDERS prices and NAVs (given the previous arbitrage arguments) and the size of the deviations between the transaction prices of the underlying securities (which lead to the NAVs and the IOPVs) and unobserved fundamental values. Lower aggregate liquidity may therefore be expected to lead to larger overall deviations. In light of these arguments, the next section will discuss a procedure to identify the size of the deviations between SPIDERS transaction prices and the unobserved fundamental values of the underlying portfolio of security (and, of course, SPIDERS shares).
We employ high-frequency transaction prices on SPIDERS obtained from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database in CRSP for the period February 1993 -March 2005. We use the entire consolidated market. The cross-sectional asset pricing tests employ monthly return data on the 25 size-and value-sorted Fama-French portfolios over the same period.
We now formalize our assumed high-frequency SPIDERS price formation mechanism and our methodology to separate the volatility of SPIDERS fundamental values from the volatility of SPI- 5 In addition, SPIDERS continue to trade 15 minutes after the NYSE closes. This is another source of error for the posted NAV. 6 At the stock level and, by aggregation, at the index level, these deviations might also depend on asymmetric information (see, e.g., the discussion in Stoll, 2000 , and the references therein).
DERS deviations from fundamental values, i.e., the factor proxies.
Extracting the proxies
Building on the intuition laid out above, we express the logarithmic SPIDERS transaction price prevailing at the end of a trading day t of length h as e p th = p th + th t = 1; 2; :::; T;
where p is the unobservable fundamental value and is an equally unobservable price deviation.
As said, higher market liquidity should lead to smaller price deviations .
Now divide each trading day into M (equispaced, for notational simplicity) sub-periods. The j-th intra-daily continuously-compounded return between day t 1 and day t is de…ned as e r j;t = e p (t 1)h+j e p (t 1)h+(j 1) j = 1; 2; :::; M;
where = h=M is the interval over which the intra-daily returns are computed. Thus, similarly to the observed price process, the observed return process comprises a fundamental return component, r j;t = p (t 1)h+j p (t 1)h+(j 1) , as well as a deviation component, j;t = (t 1)h+j (t 1)h+(j 1) , i.e., e r j;t = r j;t + j;t t = 1; 2; :::; T; j = 1; 2; :::; M:
Our objects of interest are the variance of the unobserved daily fundamental returns r t = p th p (t 1)h and the variance of the unobserved intra-daily price deviations j;t . The former will proxy for daily market-wide variance, the latter will proxy for daily aggregate illiquidity.
To this extent, for each day in our sample, we compute 
Mt
; identify the second moment of the return deviations . This is due to fundamental returns that wash out at high frequencies. By the same type of reasoning, P M t j=1 e r 2 j;t will give us information about the (integrated, over the trading day) volatility of the fundamental return process if observed returns are sampled at appropriately-chosen, lower frequencies M t . Importantly, the selection of M t may be conducted "optimally" based, for example, on a mean-squared error criterion. The Appendix imposes statistical assumptions on r j;t and j;t which make this intuition rigorous while fully justifying the adopted estimators. Details are also provided about the construction of the optimal M t . Alternative approaches and potential extensions are discussed.
In sum, for every day in our sample we use (potentially standardized) sums of observable intradaily returns sampled at optimal (time-varying) frequencies to identify the variance components of the returns'unobservable components, r and . These daily measures are subsequently aggregated to the monthly level, as we discuss below.
Importantly, since P M t j=1 e r 2 j;t is computed over a 6-hour trading period (from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.), in order to convert it into a genuinely daily measure, we correct it for lack of overnight returns.
We do so by multiplying it by the constant factor =
; where R t and b V t = P M t j=1 e r 2 j;t are the daily SPIDERS return and the (6-hour) optimally-sampled realized variance measure over day t. This correction ensures that the average of the corrected variance estimates coincides with the variance of the daily returns (see, e.g., Fleming et al., 2001 Fleming et al., , 2003 ).
Aggregation
We evaluate pricing at the monthly level. We therefore average the deviation variances across days in a speci…c month k to obtain monthly measures:
As for the fundamental return variance, we sum the daily realized variances across days in a month to, again, obtain the corresponding monthly values:
Finally, we compute innovations. In the price deviation case, we have
In the fundamental return case, we have
To summarize, we hypothesize that (i ) innovations in SPIDERS fundamental price variance re ‡ect innovations in market variance and (ii ) innovations in SPIDERS deviation variance re ‡ect changes in aggregate illiquidity. As discussed, both hypothesis are justi…ed by the basket nature of SPI-DERS. The latter hypothesis also relies on no-arbitrage arguments. Put it di¤erently, even though SPIDERS trade like any other stock, we expect innovations in SPIDERS price deviations to be a less noisy measure of innovations in the overall market liquidity than innovations in individual stocks'price deviations. As generally argued in the industry (see, e.g., Gastineau, 2001 , and Spence, 2002) , the liquidity properties of an ETF should re ‡ect the liquidity properties of the underlying portfolio of securities. 7 To this extent, in spite of the elusive nature of liquidity and its various facets, 8 the di¤erence between transaction prices and fundamental values constitutes an extremely natural liquidity measure (Bandi and Russell, 2005) . This is the di¤erence which is quanti…ed in this work. 7 On Yahoo Finance, for example, we read: "Some investors appear to believe that the liquidity of an ETF is dependent on the fund's average trading volume, or the number of shares traded per day. However, this is not the case. Rather, a better measure of ETF liquidity is the liquidity of the underlying stocks in the index."
8 It is typical to de…ne liquidity as "the ability to trade large quantities with small price impacts in a short amount of time." 3 More on the logic of the liquidity measure Using the notation from the previous section, the price deviation (with respect to fundamental value) for trading a share of stock s in the S&P500 basket at time j on day t can be written as e p s;j p s;j = s;j = (1 2I sell ) s;j ;
where s;j 0 is the cost of buying or selling, the subscript j is short for (t 1)h + j , and I sell is a sell indicator taking on the value 0 for a buy order and 1 for a sell order. 9 The price deviation for trading the S&P500 portfolio at time j is a (value-weighted) average of price deviations expressed
where 0 > w s > 1 and P 500 s=1 w s = 1: By the nature of SPIDERS, as discussed earlier, the price di¤erence for trading a SPIDERS share at time j, i.e., spy;j , should approximately be equal to P 500 s=1 w s s;j . 10 Hence, the variance of spy , our object of interest, should roughly represent the variance of the portfolio's price deviations (associated with buy or sell orders) from the portfolio's fundamental value. This variance is small if, of course, individual stocks trade near fundamental values. More explicitly,
w s w u E(j s j j u j); (10) if the sell indicator and the individual price deviations are independent. Should the price deviations be cross-sectionally independent and identically distributed, then
and our assumed measure would capture the common (across stocks) squared expected absolute price deviation from fundamental value. Should the price deviations be cross-sectionally independent but not identically distributed, then 9 As is customary, we assume that buy orders occur at prices above fundamental values whereas sell orders occur at prices below fundamental values (see, e.g., Roll, 1984).
1 0 Here we are, of course, assuming that SPIDERS prices roughly coincide with NAVs (computed at buy or sell prices). Deviations of SPIDERS prices from NAVs would introduce an additional liquidity-related contamination whose contribution is, as said, measurable given our approach (see our comments in the previous section).
E(
and the measure would be a squared weighted average of expected absolute price deviations from fundamental values. Finally, should the s be cross-sectionally dependent (as likely the case in the presence of aggregate liquidity shocks) and not identically distributed, then
Generally speaking, the larger the individual price deviations from fundamental values, the larger the variance of . Importantly, when the price deviations are cross-sectionally correlated, the pairwise correlations (i.e., the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (13)) ought to be taken into account. Simply averaging value-weighted …rm-speci…c estimates will underestimate the variance of the aggregate price deviations (and, therefore, the extent of market illiquidity) if these covariances are on average positive (as possibly the case in the presence of aggregate liquidity shocks). This observation, in turn, suggests that …rst applying the methods to individual stocks (rather than to an index) and subsequently value-weighing the …rm-speci…c estimates might lead to a misleading measure if the ability to buy and sell a large, diversi…ed portfolio near fundamental values is the object of interest, as in our case. In this sense, using an index (and straightforward no-arbitrage reasoning) provides a meaningful solution to the empirical issues that would be posed by the (hardly tractable) computation of moments and cross-moments of individual price deviations for a broad array of stocks using high-frequency data.
4 A look at the factors 4.1 Market volatility The 5-and 20-minute frequencies have been widely used in the literature. They are generally employed to reduce the impact of market microstructure noise ( , in our notation) on estimates of the fundamental (integrated, over the trading day) return variance. Choosing …xed intervals is, of course, ad-hoc and generally sub-optimal from a …nite sample mean-squared-error standpoint (see the Appendix). Not surprisingly, the optimally-sampled realized estimates appear better behaved than the estimates obtained by sampling at …xed intervals. As said, we focus on optimally-sampled (for each day in the sample) realized variances in what follows. For comparison, in Fig. 7 we report IFV and innovations in the Pástor and Stambaugh liquidity measure over the same period. 11 Pástor and Stambaugh's measure is a price reversal measure. The idea underlying it is that less liquid stocks should have larger price reversals following signed order ‡ow than more liquid stocks. For stock i in month k, liquidity is de…ned as the least-squares estimate from the regression r e i;t+1;k = i;t + i;k r i;t;k + i;k sign(r e i;t;k )v i;t;k + " i;t+1;k ;
Market illiquidity
where r is a stock return, r e is an excess stock return, and v is dollar volume. Pástor and Stambaugh expect to be negative in general (the price impacts of trades get reversed in the future) and larger in magnitude for less liquid stocks. To construct innovations in aggregate liquidity, they scale the di¤erences in the monthly liquidity measures by relative market size at k and average the di¤erences across stocks with data available in consecutive months, i.e.,
Subsequently, they run the regression 1 1 Data on Pástor and Stambaugh's liquidity measure are downloaded from CRSP.
Finally, innovations in aggregate (il-)liquidity are measured by P S k = u k 100 . The correlation between IFV (our illiquidity proxy) and PS is -0.23 (positive innovations signal possible illiquidity events in our case while negative innovations signal illiquidity events in the case of Pástor and Stambaugh's measure).
The correlation between IFV (PS ) and excess market returns is -0.28 (0.23). Similarly, the correlation between IV (innovations in market variance) and excess market returns is -0.41. Subsection 4.3. expands on both observations. Finally, IFV (PS ) and IV have a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.57 (-0.31). Thus, market illiquidity and market volatility are higher in times of …nancial market downturns. In addition, they correlate with each other in potentially important ways. Because they are invariably priced in isolation, both …ndings justify looking more closely at their individual (and joint) pricing ability.
In our sample, IFV is more highly correlated with SMB (i.e., the di¤erence in returns between small and large …rms) and HML (i.e., the di¤erence in returns between high and low book-to-market stocks) than PS (-0.14 and 0.14 versus -0.01 and -0.02). See Table I . An aggregate measure can then be de…ned by averaging across stocks for each month k:
As earlier, this measure can be re-scaled by
. The "illiquidity ratio" looks directly at price impacts. Periods of illiquidity are times when small volumes determine large price moves.
Finally, "share turnover" is sometimes used to quantify aggregate liquidity. For each stock i and each month k, compute 
Again, this measure can be re-scaled to achieve stationarity. Eckbo and Norli (2002) , for example, scale it by a factor 
Illiquidity and volatility premia
In this subsection we …t simple autoregressive models for V and F V . Subsequently, we regress excess market returns on lagged V and unexpected V (i.e., the residuals from the volatility autoregression).
We do the same using lagged F V and unexpected F V as regressors. The second-stage regressions are meant to evaluate the presence of market premia associated with expected and unexpected volatility (or liquidity) given a straightforward, but empirically reasonable, dynamic model for the relevant factor proxy.
To this extent, a …rst-order autoregression of V t on V t 1 gives us V t = 0:011
+ 0:74
with an R 2 of 55:7%;while a …rst-order autoregression of F V t on F V t 1 yields F V t = 0:000242
+ 0:71
with an R 2 of 50:1%: Both volatility and illiquidity are, as expected, highly persistent. V t 1 131:05
with an R 2 of 18:2%: Similarly, regressing M KT t on F V t 1 and the estimated residuals from the illiquidity autoregression we obtain 1 2 We thank Akiko Fujimoto for providing the ILL and T data.
M KT t = 0:80
(1:57)
with an R 2 of 7:7%: Finally, the joint model yields b "
with an R 2 of 18:4%:
The above results show that (i ) market returns are a statistically-signi…cant decreasing function of unexpected volatility and unexpected illiquidity (individually considered), (ii ) when volatility and illiquidity are evaluated jointly, unexpected illiquidity is dominated by unexpected volatility (i.e., the latter remains strongly statistically-signi…cant), (iii ) both expected liquidity and expected illiquidity hardly a¤ect excess market returns. This last result is of course consistent with the wellestablished inability to …nd robust risk-return trade-o¤s for the market at the monthly frequency.
Regressions (20) and (22) are in the spirit of Amihud (2002) . He …nds that market returns are an increasing function of expected illiquidity (measured by virtue of (17)) and a decreasing function of unexpected illiquidity. These …ndings may be justi…ed. Being persistent, higher current illiquidity will translate into higher expected illiquidity. If higher expected illiquidity yields higher expected returns, then higher unexpected illiquidity should lead to a drop in prices and, hence, lower realized returns.
Our results are qualitatively similar to those in Amihud (2002) . However, the statistical signi…-cance of the positive coe¢ cient on F V t 1 is, in our case, lower indicating that unexpected illiquidity has a more signi…cant (negative) e¤ect on realized stock market returns than expected illiquidity.
Using several aggregate liquidity measures in the literature, including P S and T , Fujimoto (2003) argues in favor of the same conclusion.
We show that, when allowing for unexpected volatility, the statistical signi…cance of unexpected illiquidity decreases drastically. Importantly, this result does not hinge on our assumed illiquidity measure. If we were to employ P S, the slope coe¢ cient from a regression of M KT on P S would be 22 (t-stat = 3.3), the sign being positive in light of the interpretation of P S, as discussed above.
If we regressed M KT on P S and unexpected volatility, the coe¢ cient on P S would be 9.8 (t-stat = 1.44), whereas the coe¢ cient on unexpected volatility would continue to be negative and highly statistically signi…cant, -115.5 (t-stat = -4.46).
We now run the same regressions using excess returns on the Fama-French size-sorted decile portfolios. Consider …rst regressions of the excess portfolio returns on expected and unexpected market volatility (Table III) . The coe¢ cients on V t 1 are positive but insigni…cant across portfolios.
The coe¢ cients on unexpected volatility, on the other hand, have a negative sign, as in the market case, and are consistently highly statistically signi…cant. More importantly for our purposes, these coe¢ cients decrease (in absolute value) monotonically when going from small cap stocks to large cap stocks. In other words, smaller stocks have more exposure to unexpected volatility risk than larger stocks. This exposure may of course be priced in equilibrium, as we show in the next section.
Implementing the same regressions on expected and unexpected illiquidity yields similar results (Table IV) . The absolute values of the coe¢ cients on unexpected illiquidity decrease monotonically in the size dimension (again, going from small stocks to large stocks). As earlier in the market case, however, joint consideration of unexpected illiquidity and unexpected volatility (in Table V ) leads to parameter estimates on unexpected volatility which remain statistically signi…cant while driving out the statistical signi…cance of the parameter estimates associated with unexpected illiquidity.
Having made this point, the e¤ect of the latter on excess portfolio returns remains completely monotonic with smaller stocks being more (negatively) correlated with illiquidity changes than larger stocks. Thus, while the exposures of the size portfolios' returns with respect to illiquidity are such that illiquidity may be priced (with a negative sign), these exposures are poorly estimated in a joint volatility/illiquidity speci…cation.
We conduct the same exercise with the book-to-market decile portfolios. We again …nd that the loadings of unexpected volatility on excess returns vary roughly monotonically with value, i.e., going from low book-to-market stocks to high book-to-market stocks (see Table VI ). However, these loadings decrease (become more negative). In other words, value stocks appear to be more correlated with unexpected market volatility than growth stocks. This pattern may, of course, provide a justi…cation for the well-known value premium: value stocks provide higher average returns since their payo¤s are lower in high volatility states. Di¤erently from unexpected volatility, the loadings with respect to unexpected illiquidity increase with value (Table VII) . Again, joint consideration of unexpected volatility and unexpected illiquidity tends to drive out the latter in terms of statistical signi…cance (Table VIII) . This said, the loadings on volatility changes remain decreasing and signi…cant, while the loadings on illiquidity changes are roughly increasing and insigni…cant.
Implementing the same regressions using momentum decile portfolios would yield similar …nd-ings. 13 Again, when volatility and illiquidity are individually considered, the correlation between momentum portfolios' returns and the two risk proxies is negative and decreasing with momentum. In a joint speci…cation, the illiquidity and volatility exposures follow the same pattern across momentum portfolios but only the volatility exposures are statistically signi…cant, thereby again underlining the superior robustness of the pricing results associated with the volatility proxy. Once more, while illiquidity and volatility may be priced jointly with a negative sign only the volatility factor loadings appear to be fully informative about the extent of distress risk (when, of course, interpreting illiquidity and volatility as proxies for distress risk).
We emphasize that none of these results depends on our proposed illiquidity proxy. Using the P S measure would again yield factor loadings on illiquidity which lose their statistically signi…cance when unexpected volatility is added to the model. It would also, again, lead to factor loadings with respect to unexpected illiquidity which increase with both size and value (thereby calling for a positive risk premium in the value dimension and a negative risk premium in the size dimension, which is of course problematic when pricing the size and book-to-market portfolios jointly, as done in the next section).
In sum, (i ) expected illiquidity and expected volatility have a positive, but statistically-insigni…cant, e¤ect on market and portfolio returns. If there is a premium for expected illiquidity, such a premium is as hard to detect as the more classical premium for expected volatility risk. However, (ii) unexpected illiquidity and unexpected volatility are strongly negatively correlated with market and portfolio returns. These correlations are always highly statistically signi…cant for volatility (i.e., in individual and joint models). In the case of illiquidity, they are highly statistically signi…cant only in individual speci…cations (i.e., when not accounting for volatility). If shocks to volatility are added to the speci…cation, these shocks tend to subsume the information content of illiquidity shocks. Importantly, (iii ) with the sole exception of the unexpected illiquidity loadings in the bookto-market case, the exposures (loadings) with respect to illiquidity surprises and volatility surprises align with the returns on the size and book-to-market portfolios thereby suggesting the potential for negative illiquidity and volatility risk prices (regardless of whether volatility and illiquidity are evaluated individually or jointly). We now turn to this issue.
Cross-sectional pricing
We consider a traditional intertemporal asset-pricing model as in Merton (1973) . Denote excess returns on a generic asset i by R e i and excess returns on the market by R e m : Assume existence of p state variables F s . Equilibrium expected excess returns are, as always, expressed as linear combinations of the beta of the asset returns with the market return, 
The lambdas have the usual interpretation in terms of prices of risk. Speci…cally, m is the price of market risk and s is the price of risk associated with the generic factor s.
As typically done in the literature, we employ the Fama-French 25 size-and value-sorted portfolios as test assets French, 1992, 1993 ) and focus on 2-and 3-factor models. In the 2-factor model case, p = 1 and the two factors are MKT and either volatility measure (IV or IFV ).
In the 3-factor model case, p = 2 and the three factors are MKT, IV and IFV.
The estimation method consists of two steps. In the …rst step, we estimate the betas (the factor loadings) for each portfolio by …tting a linear regression model with AR (1) 
Given the factor loadings, the prices of risk are estimated in the second step by regressing crosssectionally the portfolios'average excess returns on the factor loadings, as implied by Eq. (24).
The pricing of illiquidity and volatility risk
Figs. 8 and 9 plot the monthly average excess returns of the 25 Fama-French portfolios as well as the factor loadings obtained from 2-factor models (MKT and IV, MKT and IFV ). Fig. 10 gives the same plots in the 3-factor case (MKT, IV, and IFV ). The average excess returns have a familiar pattern: they largely increase in the growth-value dimension (i.e., going from low book-to-market to high book-to-market stocks) and decrease in the size dimension (i.e., going from small cap stocks to large cap stocks). In the 2-factor models and in the 3-factor model, both the IV and the IFV factor loadings decrease with value and increase with size, albeit sometimes not monotonically.
The inverse relation between size and factor loadings is generally stronger than the inverse relation between value and factor loadings. This is, of course, fully consistent with our results in Subsection 4.3.
As discussed earlier, because the relation between excess returns and factor loadings is largely negative across size-and value-sorted portfolio, risk may be priced with a negative sign. We test this implication by regressing average excess returns on factor loadings as described in the previous section. Table IX When combining MKT, IV, and IFV in a 3-factor model, we again …nd that all prices of risk are statistically signi…cant with t-stats equal to 4:05, 2:22, and 2:69, respectively. Across the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th book-to-market quintiles, the IV and IFV small-minus-big risk premia are now equal to 1.9%, 0.22%, and 0.94%, and 2.15%, 2%, and 5.52%, respectively (Table XI, Panel c). In sum, for our sample, market illiquidity carries a price of risk which is more statistically signi…cant than the price of risk associated with market volatility. The corresponding risk premia are also larger.
Having said this, the factor loadings are, again, more accurately estimated in the market volatility case. Speci…cally, even though controlling for excess market returns (as done when computing the factor betas in this section) lowers the statistical signi…cant of the loadings associated with both volatility and illiquidity, the volatility betas are generally statistically signi…cant. The illiquidity betas are virtually always insigni…cant. Fig. 11 displays the pricing errors. We plot realized average excess returns versus predicted average excess returns for three models, i.e., the CAPM, the Fama-French 3-factor model, and a 3-factor model with MKT, IV, and IFV. As is well-known, the Fama-French 3-factor model strongly dominates the CAPM. Interestingly, we …nd that a 3-factor model with excess market returns, market volatility, and market illiquidity compares rather favorably with the Fama-French 3-factor model when pricing the cross-section of size-and value-sorted Fama-French portfolios. Not surprisingly, some of the growth portfolios (speci…cally, the portfolios in the …rst value quintile and …rst, second, and third size quintile) are exceptions. This is, of course, easy to explain. The growth portfolios have realized average excess returns which increase, rather than decreasing, across size quintiles (see Fig. 10 , for instance). The corresponding IV and IFV loadings increase too. In other words, the become less negative. The combination of negative prices of risk with increasing loadings leads to a divergence between realized average excess returns and excess returns implied by the model: the realized excess returns on these portfolios are excessively low relative to average returns implied by the model.
Robustness
We evaluate the robustness of our previous …ndings to (i ) the use of an alternative volatility measure, (ii ) the use of an alternative illiquidity measure, and (iii ) the use of daily frequencies.
Low-frequency variance
We expect monthly volatility measures computed by aggregating intra-daily continuously-compounded squared returns to be considerably less noisy estimates than monthly measures obtained by aggregating squared daily returns. While this is true, in general, it is meaningful to ask whether the reported pricing results hinge on the use of a fairly e¢ cient volatility proxy, as in this paper. We …nd that this is not the case. Put it di¤erently, all of our …ndings having to do with individual and joint pricing hold in the presence of a more traditional volatility measure. The volatility factor loadings continue to be accurately estimated (and more accurately estimated than in the illiquidity case). Volatility continues to be priced with a negative sign whether considered in isolation or jointly with our assumed liquidity proxy. Similarly, the illiquidity risk price remains signi…cant, and of comparable magnitude, in the trivariate model. 14 
Low-frequency illiquidity
We previously emphasized that the use of PS as an illiquidity proxy would deliver illiquidity factor loadings for the size-and value-sorted portfolios which fully mimic the behavior of the illiquidity factor loadings obtained by virtue of IF V . The resulting pricing is consistent with this observation.
In a bivariate model, P S is priced with a positive sign, which is of course coherent with the interpretation of the measure (Table IX) . When controlling for either market volatility or market illiquidity, proxied by IF V , PS becomes insigni…cant. We do not attribute too much importance to the superior statistical signi…cance of IFV in comparison with PS. While this …nding may of course be sample-speci…c, the relative performance of the two illiquidity measures in relation with market volatility provides further evidence for the importance (and robustness) of market volatility in a model that allows for illiquidity pricing at the monthly level (see, also, Moise, 2006).
Daily frequencies
As in the monthly case, the portfolios'excess returns largely increase in the value dimension and decrease in the size dimension. Interestingly, contrary to the monthly case, the IV factor loadings increase fairly monotonically with both value and size. The size e¤ect, however, appears stronger, thereby con…rming the relation between size and volatility loadings documented by Moise (2006) . Table X contains the corresponding prices of risk. The t-stats associated with the market price of risk and the volatility risk are equal to 1:51 and 2:64. Thus, despite the positive relation between value and volatility loadings, and in light of the stronger negative relation between size and volatility loadings, we …nd a negative price of volatility risk at daily frequency.
Turning to a 2-factor model with MKT and IFV, the IFV factor loadings increase with size and decrease with value, albeit not monotonically. The resulting e¤ect is a strongly signi…cant IFV price of risk in the daily cross-section of Fama-French portfolios. The t-stat for the illiquidity price of risk is equal to 3:54 whereas the market price of risk carries a t-stat equal to 1:08.
When combining MKT, IV and IFV in a 3-factor model, illiquidity largely subsumes the information contained in volatility in terms of resulting pricing. The price of volatility risk becomes insigni…cant (t-stat of 0:78) while the t-stat associated with the price of illiquidity risk is now 3:82. As in the monthly case, this result completely ignores estimation accuracy associated with the illiquidity and volatility risk exposures. In the joint model, the illiquidity factor loadings nicely align with the portfolios average returns, hence the statistical signi…cance of the resulting prices of illiquidity risk. However, contrary to the univariate model, the illiquidity loadings lose their statistical signi…cance when allowing for exposures to volatility shocks. Thus, even at daily frequencies, the pricing of illiquidity risk is still arguably less robust than the pricing of volatility risk. In the joint model, the signi…cance of the …nal risk prices is therefore to be taken with caution.
Conclusions
Market volatility and market illiquidity have received much attention in recent work on crosssectional asset pricing. In spite of the substantial correlation between macro volatility and macro illiquidity events, their joint pricing has, however, seldom been considered. We investigate the joint pricing of volatility and illiquidity by using novel proxies extracted from high-frequency SPIDERS transaction data. In particular, aggregate illiquidity is measured by the volatility of the di¤er-ence between observed SPIDERS prices and unobserved SPIDERS fundamental values. Market volatility is measured by the volatility of unobserved SPIDERS fundamental values. Reliance on high-frequency data makes our market volatility proxy more e¢ cient than proxies …ltered from low frequency market returns as in the current asset pricing literature. Similarly, using data sampled at high frequencies and treating equilibrium prices as unobservable has the potential to lead to a more e¤ective quanti…cation of the extent of market frictions (see, e.g., Bandi and Russell, 2005 , and the references therein).
We show that innovations in our derived illiquidity proxy correlate with macro illiquidity events in important ways. We also show that, when jointly considered in the context of classical asset pricing paradigms, market volatility and market illiquidity are negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns. In our sample, the performance of a 3-factor model with market returns, (innovations in) market volatility, and (innovations in) market illiquidity appears to be similar to the performance of the Fama-French 3-factor model when pricing the Fama-French size-and book-to-market-sorted portfolios.
This favorable pricing result is due to return exposures with respect to illiquidity and volatility shocks which align in meaningful ways with observed mean portfolio returns. In particular, portfolios with higher average returns generally correlate more negatively with innovations in volatility and illiquidity. These portfolios pay o¤ less in adverse states of the world, thereby requiring compensation for risk.
Liquidity and volatility are admittedly more fundamental economic variables than portfolio returns, like SMB and HML, routinely used as systematic factors in the literature. However, they are still likely to be proxies for a more fundamental distress factor. While our results point to the joint pricing ability of correlated risk proxies previously analyzed in isolation, we emphasize that exposures to volatility shocks are more robustly estimated than exposures to illiquidity shocks.
Hence, volatility pricing is arguably more robust than liquidity pricing. In particular, as shown, the information contained in illiquidity shocks is largely subsumed by that contained in volatility shocks in joint speci…cations. Put it di¤erently, once one controls for volatility shocks, the signi…cance of the illiquidity exposures decreases substantially. While this result is robust across measures and does not depend on our assumed illiquidity (or volatility) proxy, it might still hinge on the fact that current illiquidity measures do not capture all relevant facets of illiquidity. It may also be a genuine economic fact speaking to the superior ability of market volatility as a proxy for the type of distress risk investors hedge against.
Appendix
This Appendix provides a discussion of the assumptions imposed on the fundamental return process r and price deviations justifying our identi…cation approach.
As in much recent work in high-frequency econometrics (see, e.g., the discussions in the review papers of Bandi and Russell, 2008b , and Barndor¤-Nielsen and Shephard, 2007), we model the fundamental return process as a stochastic volatility martingale di¤erence sequence driven by Brownian shocks, i.e.,
where s is a càdlàg spot volatility process bounded away from zero. Spot volatility can therefore display jumps, diurnal e¤ects, high-persistence (possibly of the long memory type), and nonstationarities. The price deviations are assumed to be independent of the fundamental prices and i.i.d. with a bounded fourth moment. In consequence, the return deviations follow an MA(1) model with a negative …rst-order autocovariance equal to 2E( 2 ). Since the fundamental returns are uncorrelated, the structure of the return deviations carries over to the observed high-frequency returns. The empirical autocorrelation properties of the high-frequency SPIDERS returns strongly supports this simple speci…cation (see Fig. 1 ).
Importantly, the deviations are modeled as having a stochastic order of magnitude O p (1). Price discreteness, as well as the existence of di¤erent prices for buyers and sellers, for instance, justify this assumption (Bandi and Russell, 2006) . Thus, the friction returns do not vanish at high sampling frequencies. Technically, = O p (1). Di¤erently from the deviation returns, the fundamental return process r has an order of magnitude O p ( p ) over any sub-interval of length , thereby implying that the magnitude of the fundamental price changes decreases with the sampling interval. This assumption, which is standard in continuous-time asset pricing, represents slow accumulation and processing of information leading to negligible fundamental price updates over small time intervals.
Exploiting the di¤erent stochastic orders of and r, Russell (2006, 2008) show that sample moments of high-frequency return data sampled at the highest frequencies at which information arrives identify the deviation moments. Availability of high sampling frequencies is represented here by an asymptotic design which lets the distance between observations go to zero in the limit or, equivalently, lets the number of observations M go o¤ to in…nity for every trading day. In the second moment case, one obtains
The result in Eq. (27) hinges on the fact that the deviation process dominates the fundamental return process at high frequencies. More explicitly, when computing sample moments of the observed return data, the fundamental return component r washes out asymptotically since its stochastic order, O p ( p ), is smaller than the stochastic order of the frictions , O p (1). Hence, the moments of the observed returns consistently estimate the deviation moments at high frequencies. Importantly, this consistency result would not be a¤ected by the presence of infrequent news arrivals leading to discrete changes in the fundamental price process. In other words, one could easily allow for the presence of a Poisson jump component in the fundamental prices or returns r (see Bandi and Russell, 2005) . The estimator, and its consistency properties, would not change. These arguments justify using the estimator in Eq. (27) . Because we employ a large number of high-frequency returns per trading day (the average number of intra-daily returns is about 3,000) we expect the consistency result in Eq. (27) to be fairly accurate and the corresponding estimator to be informative.
We now turn to the variance of the fundamental return process, i.e., V t = R t t 1 2 s ds. In the absence of deviations, the sum of the squared intra-daily returns P M j=1 e r 2 j;t (realized variance) estimates V t consistently as M ! 1 (see, e.g., Andersen et al., 2003 , and Barndor¤-Nielsen and Shephard, 2002). The presence of deviations leads to an important bias-variance trade-o¤. High sampling frequencies may determine substantial noise accumulation and biased estimates. Low sampling frequencies may lead to (fairly) unbiased but highly volatile estimates. Russell (2006, 2008) provide a simple rule-of-thumb to optimize this trade-o¤ and choose the optimal sampling frequency (or, equivalently, the optimal number of observations M ) for every horizon of interest. For each day in our sample, given the assumed price formation mechanism, the (approximate) optimal number of observations M t may be de…ned as
where b Q t is equal to
Pf M j=1 e r 4 j;t , the quarticity estimator of Barndor¤-Nielsen and Shephard (2002) with returns sampled every 15 minutes, and b t is equal to
, the friction-in-returns second moment estimator raised to the second power. The optimal number of observations M t can be interpreted as a signalto-noise ratio. The higher the signal coming from the underlying fundamental price process ( b Q t estimates R t t 1 4 s ds) relative to the size of the frictions (as represented by b t ), the higher the optimal number of high-frequency observations needed for realized variance estimation. Fig. 2 (Panel a) reports a histogram of the optimal sampling intervals and corresponding descriptive statistics. The average interval is about 29 minutes, the median value is about 14 minutes. Fig. 2 (Panel b) presents a time-series plot of the optimal sampling intervals. The intervals display an obvious downward trend. This trend is due to deviation second moment estimates being relatively higher in the …rst part of the sample (see Fig. 4 ). According to the ratio in Eq. (28) , in order to achieve deviation reduction, a higher relative deviation component should lead to a smaller optimal number of return observations and, thus, a lower optimal sampling frequency.
Identi…cation of both the deviations second moments and the return variance can be generalized. We could allow for virtually unrestricted dependence in the frictions along similar lines as in Bandi and Russell (2005) . As discussed above, this extension is empirically unimportant for our data given its clear MA ( Table XI Risk Premia
The differences in risk premia between small-cap and large-cap stocks are estimated as the product between the factors' risk prices and the differences in the factors' loadings. IV represents innovations in market volatility. IFV represents innovations in illiquidity. Results are reported in percentages, per month.
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